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The Court of Appeal of England has recently decided, that
a solicitor employed by a client in regard to his claim against
Attorney

a third person has no implied authority, before

and Client,
Compromise
of Right of
Action

action is brought, to effect a compromise of the
claim, there being no difference between the case
of a solicitor who appears for a party in an action,
and one who acts for a person where no action is

as yet in existence: Macauley v. Polley, [1897]

2

Q. B.

122.

The Supreme Court of Michigan has lately held, that under
the statute of that state, (How. Ann. Stat. Mich. § 3582,) which
gives turnpike companies a right to collect tolls
Trcycie,
from persons traveling on their roads in vehicles

drawn by animals, a turnpike company has no,

right to charge for the use of its road, by persons using
bicycles: Murfin v. Detroit & E. Plank Road Co., 71 N. W.
Rep. I io8.
This case follows Williams v. Ellis, 5 Q. B. D. 175, I88O,
and rejects Geiger v. Turnpike Road, 167 Pa. 583, 1895,
where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania prescribed that
a bicycle should be charged toll, " according to the number
of wheels and horses drawing the same."
An ordinance requiring every person who uses a bicycle to
ring an alarm bell upon approaching any and all crossings or
Warning of
Approach

cross walks, enacted in pursuance of statutory

authority to regulate the riding of bicycles, is not,

as a matter of law, unreasonable: City of Emporia
v. Wagner, (Court of Appeals of Kansas, Southern Department, C. D.,) 49 Pac. Rep. 701.
In Nauman v. Weidman, 37 Atl. Rep. 863, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania recently ruled that a devise of land to
a religious association in trust to devote the
Charities,
Devise for
income to keeping the testator's family lot in the
Charitable
meeting house graveyard in order, and to distribute
Use,
the balance in amounts specifically limited, to
Burial Lot,
Missions
home or foreign missions, and the residue among
the needy poor of the vicinity, as the trustees and their
successors might think best, created a valid trust for charitable
uses, and not a perpetuity.
642

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

School directors may not permit the use of school buildings
for sectarian religious meetings, nor for the holding of public lyceums, nor for any purposes other
than those recognized as school purposes: Bender
v. Streabiek, (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,)
37
Atl. Rep. 853.
A constitutional amendment may become a law, though
Constitutional the legislature made no joint resolution forAmendment,
mally declaring that it should be submitted
Adoption
to the people, and though it was not printed
upon each ticket upon the ballots voted in the general election:
State v. Herried,(Supreme Court of South Dakota,) 72 N. W.
Rep. 93.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has declared unconstitutional an act (Gen. Stat. Minn. 1894, § 7926,)'which requires
of the state
Constitutional the governor to appoint members
board of pharmacy from among a certain number
Law,
Appointment of pharmacists elected by the state pharmaceutical
of Officers association, on the ground that it creates an unauthorized limitation upon the appointing power: Statev. Griffin,
72 N, W. Rep. 117.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has lately decided that
the statute of that state, (Pub. Laws R. I. 1882-5, c. 298,)
Administration, which provides for the administration of the
Estate of
estate of one who has been absent and "not
Supposed
heard from, directly or indirectly, for the term
Decedent
of seven years," as if he were dead, violates
Common
Schools,
Use of
School House

Art. I., § io, of the state constitution, and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, providing that no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law: Carrv. Brown, 38 Atl. Rep. 9.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has recently held
unconstitutional the statute of 1895, c. 70, § ii, amending
Rev. Stat. Me. c. 6, § 205, which required the
Contesting
Tax Sales
owner of land sold for non-payment of taxes to
deposit with the clerk of court the amount of all taxes,
interests and costs accrued up to that time, before he should
be permitted to contest the validity of the tax or sale, on the
ground that it infringed upon the constitutional rights of the
citizen not to be deprived of his property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land, to have remedy
by due course of law for any injury done to his property, and
to have right and justice administered to him freely and without
sale: Bennett v. Davis, 37 Atl. Rep. 86 4-
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A state may lawfully compel its counties and cities to.
indemnify against losses of property arising from mobs and
Liabilityfor riots within their limits, independently of any
Damage
misconduct or negligence on the part of such city
by Mob
or county to which the loss can be attributed;
and a statute imposing such liability is therefore constitutional: Penna. Co. v. Chicago, (Circuit Court, N. D. Illinois,)
81 Fed. Rep. 317.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in Schmitt v. Mitchell,
41 S. W. Rep. 929, has recently had occasion to pass upon
Corporations, a number of questions in regard to voting at
Elections,
corporation elections.
Voting,
It holds (i) That the stock of a decedent
Executors
belongs to and may be voted by his personal
representatives, until there has been a settlement and division
of his estate; that one of several executors may vote stock
belonging to the estate, in the absence of his co-executors,
and that a proxy given by one of the absent executors is
revoked by the vote of the one who is present; and that the
provision in such a proxy that it shall remain in force until
revoked by the grantor in a certain way does not prevent its revocation by the co-executor; (2) That under the constitutional
provision for cumulativevoting, (Const. Ky. § 207,)
Cumulative it is no objection to the validity of an election that
the stockholders did not vote cumulatively, when it
does not appear that any of them claimed the right to do so;
(3) That one who holds stock as executor may be elected a
Directors
director of a corporation ; (4) That the fact that a.
full board of directors is not elected at an election,
because one of the candidates is ineligible, does not authorize
the old board to hold over; those who are duly elected constitute the board and have power to fill the vacancy; and (5)
That notice to stockholders of the fact that one for whom
they vote as a director is not a stockholder does not authorizethe ignoring of their votes, so as to give the election to a candidate who has a minority of the votes cast, unless it clearly
appears that they knew that that fact amounted to a disqualification.
A vendor's promise to compensate the officers of a private
corporation for services in its promotion and organization, and
for procuring the sale of his land to it, which has
Promoters,
Compensation not been rescinded, is not necessarily illegal by
from Vendor reason of the antagonistic relations involved and
the special opportunities afforded for fraud, no actual fraud.
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having been disclosed: Dexter v. McClellan, (Supreme Court
of Alabama,) 22 So. Rep. 461.
The sale of the entire property of a corporation will not be
enjoined at the instance of a single stockholder, in the absenceof unfairness, fraud, or, oppression, when the sale
Rights of
Stockholder was authorized by a vote of more than eleven,
hundred out of one thousand three hundred and fifty shares:.
Peabody v. Westerly Waterworks, (Supreme Court of Rhode
Island,) 37 Atl. Rep. 807.
An action for money had and received will not lie at thesuit of a corporation to recover a sum received by a former
Directors,
director as a bribe for resigning his office and
Fraud
procuring the delivery of the control of the corporation to the briber for fraudulent purposes; the only
rernedy of the corporation in such a case is an action to.
recover damages for the fraud practiced upon it by the directors: McClure v. Law, Supreme Court Appellate Division
First Department, 46 N. Y. Suppl. 775; McClure v. Trask,.
46 N. Y. Suppl. 780.

When a stock broker has converted securities belonging to.
his customers, by pledging them to third parties, the fact that
Election of
the customers receive from the pledgees whatever
Remedies
proceeds of the securities remain after satisfying.
the pledge does not constitute such an election of remedies
as to debar them from pursuing the broker for the rest of theiiloss: In re Pierson's Estate, (Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division, Third Department,) 46 N. Y. Suppl. 557.The Supreme Court of Missouri has lately decided, that
under the election law of that state, April I8, 1893, (Laws
1893, p. 164,) which provides that "any electorElections,
Disability,
who declares under oath to the judges of election
Marking
having charge of the ballots that he cannot read
Ballots
or write, or that by reason of physical disability
he is unable to mark his ballot, may declare his choice of
candidates to the judges, having charge of the ballots, who,
in the presence of the elector, shall prepare the ballot for
voting .

.

. Provided, however, that the provisions of this

section shall not be construed to allow any judge or judges of
any election to enter a booth for the purpose of assisting any
elector in preparing his ballot. Such judges, after reading to
the elector the contents of the ballot shall without leaving
their respective positions prepare such ballot as the electormay dictate," a ballot is not vitiated by the fact that the
judges assisted in preparing it without the preliminary oath,
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required by statute, or by the fact that they went into a booth,
in violation of the statute, to assist in preparing the ballot:
Hope v. Flentge, 41 S. W. Rep. 1002.
Barclay, C. J., and Macfarlane and Robinson, JJ., dissented.
When a cross outside the circle in a ballot appears to have
been made intentionally with a pencil, while a cross within the
circle was made with the official stamp, it is to be
Ballots,
presumed that the cross outside the circle was
Marking
made as an identifying mark, and
the ballot
should not be counted; but when an imperfect cross is made
at the right of the name of a certain candidate, and may have
been made for the purpose of voting for the candidate for the
same office on another ticket, without accomplishing that
purpose, the ballot should be counted, though the mark was
intentionally made; and ballots defaced by ink blots should
not be rejected, when the blotting seems to be not intentional,
but accidental, and due chiefly to the use of poor paper for
the ballots: Church v. Walker, (Supreme Court of South
Dakota,) 72 N. W. Rep. ioi.
Under the election law of New York, (Laws. N. Y. 1896,
*c.

909,) a ballot on which the cross-mark is placed before the

name of a candidate, but not in the "voting space," is not
valid, and should not be counted: People v. Common Council
-of City of Elmira, (Supreme Court of New York, Appellate
Division, Third Department,) 46 N. Y. Suppl. 701.
The cross-mark on a ballot need not be perfect, but it must
be in the proper place; and under Election Law N. Y. § 105,
.as amended by Laws 1896, c. 909, which provides that the
cross-mark shall be made " before" the name of each candidate for whom the voter wishes to vote, a ballot will not be
counted for an office if no cross is placed before any name
-printed thereon for that office, though one is placed after one
of the names printed in the space provided for voting for a
person whose name may be written in the blank space left for
that purpose, no name, however, being written therein: People
-v. Merer, (Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division,
Second Department,) 46 N. Y. Suppl. 898.
On the principle that "Res ipsa loquitur," the escape of
Electric
electricity from a street railway, resulting in the
Railways,
fright and injury of a horse being driven on a
Escape of
*cpeupin
nggne

Electricity,

public street, creates a presumption of negligence

in the operation of the railway: Trenton Pass. Ry.
Co. v. Cooper, (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey,)
Negligence

37 Atl. Rep. 730.
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The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has lately decided
that a bill in which all the complainants seek as taxpayers to
enjoin the defendant municipality from purchasing
Equity,
Pleading,
the plant of a waterworks company joined as a
Muitifarious- defendant, and in which one complainant further
ness
seeks as a stockholder of the company to enjoin
the sale on the ground of inadequacy of price, is multifarious:
Peabody v. Westerly Water Works, 37 Atl. Rep. 807.
The Court of Appeal of England has recently held, affirming the decision of Stirling, J., ([1897] i Q. B. 44o,) that
when a grantor who has no title purports by deed
Estoppel,
Deed from
to convey to A. a piece of land for life, with reGrantor
mainders over, and A, enters upon the land under
without Title,
Acquisition of the deed, and afterwards acquires a good title by
Title by
possession against the true owner, A. and his
Grantee
privies are estopped, as against the remainderman,
from disputing the validity of the deed: Dalton v. Fitzgerald,
[1897] 2 Ch. 86.
The Flatchcraft Insurance Manual, with the mortuary
tables therein contained, is admissible to prove
the expectancy of life of one deceased, it being
shown that it is a standard authority among insurers: Missouri, K. & T Ry. Co. of Texas v. Ransom, (Court
of Civil Appeals of Texas,) 41 S. W. Rep. 826.
Evidence,
Expectation
of Life

The Supreme Court of Alabama holds, that the federal
courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction of the
False
Pretenses,
offense of obtaining money under the false prePension
tense of being a pension agent, but that one who
Agent
falsely pretends to be such is punishable under
§ 38 11 of the Code of i886, defining the offense of obtaining
money under false pretenses: Pearce v. State, 22 So. Rep. 502.
The Court of Appeal of England has recently decided that
a right to fish, created by a deed conveying "the exclusive
right of fishing" in a certain river, with a proviso
Fishing,
that "the right of fishing hereby granted shall
Grant of
Fishery,
only extend to fair rod and line angling, and to
Action by
netting for the sole purpose of procuring fishGrantee
baits," was not a mere license to fish, but a right
to catch fish and carry them away; that it was therefore a
.profit i prendre and an incorporeal hereditament; that the
grantee had a right of action against any one who wrongfully
did any act by which the enjoyment of the rights given to
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him by the deed was prejudicially affected; and that therefore
-he could maintain an action against one who wrongfully discharged certain sediment into the stream, thus driving away
the fish and injuring the breeding: Fitzgerald v. Firbank,
D[897]

2

Q. B. 96.

A common fishing line, fastened to an object on the bank
and extending into the water, with one hook
Fishing
thereon, is not a "set line:" State v. Stevens,
,(Supreme Court of Vermont,) 38 Atl. Rep. 80.
Under Penal Code Wash. § 63, which provides that every
.person who shall falsely make . . . " any record, deed, will,
Forgery
codicil, bond, writing obligatory, promissory note
for money or property, receipt for property, power

-of attorney, certificate of a justice of the peace or other public
.officer, auditor's warrant, treasury note, county order, accept.ance or indorsement of any bill of exchange, promissory note,
-draft or order, or assignment of any bond, writing obligatory,
or promissory note for money or property, or any other
instrument in writing, .

.

. shall be deemed guilty of forgery;"

a mere account, which creates no obligation, and is of itself
neither an evidence of debt nor of title, is not the subject of
forgery: State v. Heaton, (Supreme Court of Washington,)
.49 Pac. Rep. 493.
Under a statute (Rev. Stat. Tex. 1895, Art. 252,) which
,provides that no "current wages for personal services shall
-Garnishment, ever be subject to garnishment," past-due wages
Exemption,
left in the employer's hands because of inability to
Wages
collect them are exempt, but not past-due wages
voluntarily left with the employer. These cease to be current
wages: Davidson v. F. H. Logeman Chair Co., (Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas,) 41 S. W. Rep. 824.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
Hurlbut v. Turnure, 8i Fed. Rep. 2o8, affirming 76 Fed.
Rep. 587, has held that a mere deficiency of five
General
or even ten tons below the customary and probAverage,
Short
ably adequate supply of coal for a contemplated
CoalSupply, voyage does not make the ship an insurer against
Liability of
Ship,
damages, so as to exempt the cargo from a genPort of
eral average charge in respect of damages not
REeugn,
due to the deficiency; but that a steamship which
fails to take the customary supply of coal for a

-voyage must be presumed to voluntarily assume the risk of
putting into a port of refuge to complete her supply; and
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she will therefore be chargeable with the expenses of the
port of refuge, even if, as it turns out, she would have been
-obliged, because of delays from adverse storms, to seek such
-port for a further supply had she started with the usual
-quantity.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has adopted the prevalent rule
that death caused by accidental drowning is death "through
external, violent, and accidental means," within
Accident
Insurance,
the meaning of the stipulation of an accident
Drowning
policy which insures against death by such
-means: United States Hut. Acc. Assn. v. Hubbell, 47 N. E.
Rep. 544There is "a total loss" of an insured building when the
only portions of it left unimpaired are the foundaFire
Insurance,
tions and a part of a wall which cannot be utilized
Total uoss
at a less expense than if built anew: O'Keefe v.
-Liverpool, L. & G. Ins. Co., (Supreme Court of Missouri,
Division No. 2,) 41 S. W. Rep. 922.
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, affirming Lawrence v. Schaefer, 42 N..Y.
Suppl. 992, 1897, (36 Amt. L. REG. N. S. 202,)
Lloyd's
Policy,
holds that a stipulation in a Lloyd's insurance
Suits
policy executed by one of the underwriters for
.himself, and as attorney in fact for the others, that no action
to enforce the provisions of the policy shall be brought except
.against said attorney who is designated to represent all the
underwriters, and that each will abide the result of that action,
is valid, and precludes separate actions against the several
underwriters until their liability has been fixed on the action
.against the attorney: Lawrence v. Schaefer,46 N.Y. Suppl. 719.
In a case recently heard by Collins, J., of the Queen's Bench
Division, a ship, insured under a policy covering war risks,
Marine
was captured by a cruiser belonging to one of two
Insurance,
belligerent governments, while carrying contraCapture,
Return of
band of war destined for the other. The shipowners
thereupon gave the underwriters notice of abandonment, which was refused; and shortly afterwards they began an action on the policy. The prize court
decreed the vessel to be lawful prize, but the war being then
.at an end, did not confiscate her, but ordered that she be
,eturned to her owners. At the trial of the action on the
policy, the court reserved for further consideration the point
as to the effect of the restoration; but came finally to the
,conclusion that as it was after the bringing of the action, it did
Vessel,
Total Loss
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not disentitle the owners to recover as for a total loss : Ruys
v. London Assurance Corporation, [1897]

2

Q. B. 135.

The governor of a state has the power to revoke his warrant
for the surrender of an alleged fugitive from justice at any
time before he is taken out of the state; and if, in
Interstate
a habeas corpus proceeding in behalf of the alleged
Rendition,
fugitive, it appears that the warrant has been
Revoking
Warrant
revoked, he must be discharged. The grounds
of the revocation cannot be inquired into: State v. Toole,
(Supreme Court of Minnesota,) 72 N. W. Rep. 53.
An action may be brought in respect of an act committed.
without the jurisdiction of the forum, if the act is wrongful
Jurisdiction, both there and in the country where it is
committed; but the act need not be the subject
Tort
Committed in of civil proceedings in the foreign country; a libel
Foreign
Country,
Libel

which would ground a criminal prosecution there
may be the subject of an action for damages in
the forum: Machado v. Fontes, (Court of Appeal of England,>
[1897] 2 Q. B. 231.
A mere unexecuted intent to remove, without any attempt
to carry it into effect, is not an attempt to remove in any sense
Landlord and of the term, and will not justify the landlord in distraining under a covenant in a lease authorizing
Tenant,
immediate distress for the balance of rent for the
Distress
term upon either removal or attempted removal: Klein v.
McFarland, (Superior Court of Pennsylvania,) 5 Pa. Super.
Ct. I10.
The Court of Appeal of England has recently held, that
when the publication of a libel is admitted, the plaintiff should
not be allowed to inspect a document which the
Libel,
inspection of defendant admits is in his possession, but claims
to be merely the original contribution, as published
Documents
by him. The plaintiff has no right to thus compel disclosure
of the author of the libel: Hope v. Brash, [1897] 2 Q. B. 188.
Kekewich, J., of the Chancery Division of the Supreme
Court of Judicature of England, has laid down the principle
Light and Air,
Photographer,
Interference,
Inlunction

that any one who is in the present enjoyment of
an access of light to his premises for a special or
extraordinary purpose, such as taking photographs, may have an injunction against inter-

ference with that access of light, irrespective of the length of
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-time he has enjoyed it, provided that his enjoyment be prior
to the interference: Lazarus v. Artistic Photographic Co.,
11I897] 2 Ch. 214.
This case overrules Lanfranchi v. Mackenzie, 4 L. R. Eq.
421, 1867, where an injunction was refised a firm of silk
merchants against the erection of a building which would
interfere with the light coming to their windows, causing a
glare which was wholly unsuited for the purpose of sampling
raw silk. In the present case the interference was also by
producing a glaring light unfitted for photographic purposes.
The principle here announced seems also founded on better
-reason than that in Lindsey v. FirstNat. Bk., 115 N. C. 553,
1894, where it was held that the lessees of the second story
-of a building for the purpose of taking photographs had no
right of action against one who erected a building upon the
adjoining lot and obstructed their windows, though their lessor
-owned the adjoining strip of land upon which the wall was
,erected.
When, by contract, the parties buy lots of different values,
.each paying one hundred dollars, and the lot each purchaser is to receive is determined by drawing
Lotteries
from a box a card with the description of the
lot upon it, the transaction is a lottery: Paulk v. JasperLand
-Co., (Supreme Court of Alabama,) 22 So. Rep. 495.

Barr, District Judge of the Circuit Court for the District of
iKentucky, has rendered a very important decision in reference
to the right of the postoffice authorities to seize
mail matter under what is known as a fraud order.
'als,

'Fraud Orders,
He holds, (i) That the act of Congress of March
Powers of
Post.Office
2, 1895, authorizing the postmaster general, on a
Authorities determination upon evidence satisfactory to him

'that a person or company is using the mails for the purpose of
-conducting a lottery or other fraudulent scheme, to order a
postmaster to return to the senders all mail received at his
.office directed to such person or company, or his or its agents
or representatives, is within the powers of Congress to prescribe
what matter shall be excluded from the mails; but that the
postmaster general has no power to order such mail matter to
be sent to the dead-letter office, without regard to whether
such matter is or is not non-mailable; (2) That the refusal of
the postmaster to deliver mail matter addressed to a private
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person, a citizen of the United States, and the return of suchmail to the senders, or to the dead-letter office, without regard
to whether it is non-mailable, though done in pursuance of an
executive order of the postmaster general, on a determination
by him that the person to whom such mail is addressed is using
the mails for unlawful purposes, is a violation of the fourth
amendment to the constitution, securing the people against
unreasonable seizures of their papers and effects; and (3) That
the circuit court has jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining a postmaster from withholding mail matter from a citizen.
to whom it is directed, under an order of the postmaster
general which was beyond the scope of his constitutional
authority: Hoover v. McChesney, 8 1 Fed. Rep. 472.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has recently decided
that a pastor rightfully instructing a doorkeeper of a church
Master and to admit only such as have tickets is liable for
Servant,
injuries resulting from the use of unnecessary
Pastor of

force by the doorkeeper in preventing one who.

Church,
Liability for
Acts of

had no ticket from entering; but he will not beliable for the act of the doorkeeper in directing
Servant
a police officer to arrest one who seeks to enter
without a ticket, on the ground of a false arrest, since thedoorkeeper in so doing does not act within the apparent"
scope of his authority: Barabasz v. Kabat, 37 Atl. Rep. 720.
The Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories has declared valid an ordinance--of-th-L-egislative Assembly providing that "it shall be lawful for any justice of'
Wages,
Summary

the peace, on complaint on oath by any employe

Remedy to

or other servant, of ill-usage, non-payment of

Enforce

wages, the same having been first demanded, or
improper

dismissal by his master or employer, to
cause such master or employer to be brought before him, and
upon proof to his satisfaction of the complaint being well
founded, to order such complainant to be discharged from
his employment, and to order such master or employer to
pay such complainant one month's wages in addition to the
amount-of wages then actually due him, not exceeding two
months' wages, as aforesaid, together with the costs of prosecution, the same to be levied by distress and sale of the
offender's goods and chattels, and, in default of sufficient
distress, to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding onemonth, unless the said moneys and costs be sooner paid:
In re Gower, 17 Can. L. T. 298.
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

has lately ruled,

(t) That it is an unlawful intimidation of employes for a large
Strikes,
Intimidation
of

Employes,

Liability to
Employer

number of persons to surround them, and follow
them for a considerable distance, urging them in
a hostile manner not to go to work, and calling
them opprobrious names, though no actual physical violence is used; (2) That when laborers

are going to a place of employment, whether under contract
or in search of work, others have no right to stop them and
occupy their time without their consent, (or that of their
employer, if actually employed,) in order to peacefully urge
them not to go to work; and (3) That those who commit
such unlawful acts are liable to the employer in damages:
O'Neilv. Behannar,37 Atl. Rep. 843.
So, whenever a person by means of fraud or intimidation
procures either the breach of a contract or the discharge of a
plaintiff from an employment, which, but for such wrongful
interference, would have continued, he is liable in damages for
such injuries as naturally result therefrom; and the rule is the
same whether by these wrongful means a contract of employment, definite as to time, is broken, or an employer is induced,
solely by reason of such procurement, to discharge an emploke
whom he would otherwise have retained, even if the terms of
the contract of service are such that the employer may do this
at his pleasure, without violating any legal right of the employe. It is not, however, necessarily unlawful merely to
induce another to leave an employment or discharge an
employe, by persuasion or argument, however whimsical,
unreasonable, or absurd: Perkins v. Pendleton, (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine,) 38 Atl. Rep. 96. (See note in this
issue.)

The lessee of a mine is not liable in damages to the owner
of the surface, who has acquired a right to have the buildings
thereon uninjured by underground workings, for
Mines
and
t
the buildings by reason of
injury ooccasioned to
Mining,
Subsidence, subsidence happening during the currency of the
Liability o
lease, caused not by any act of commission on
Lessee
the part of the lessee, but due to an excavation
underground, made by the lessee's predecessor in title prior
to the date of the lease: Greenwell v. Low Beechburn Coal
Co., (Bruce, J., of the Queen's Bench Division,) [1897]

2 Q. B. 165.
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Maxey, District Judge, of the District Court for the Western
District of Texas, has lately rendered a decision involving two
t~l~iza.- very interesting questions in regard to the natution,
ralization of aliens, holding (I) that native citizens
Natl-ailty of Mexico, whatever may be their status from an
ethnological point of view, are eligible to American citizenship,
and may be naturalized on complying with the provisions of
the naturalization laws; and (2) that an alien who is ignorant
and unable to read and write, and who cannot explain the
principles of our constitution, is nevertheless entitled to be
naturalized, when it is clearly shown that he is a thoroughly
law-abiding and industrious man, of good moral character:
In re Rodriguez, 8i Fed. Rep. 337.
The practice in respect of the point involved in the second
ruling is different in most other courts.
A corporation which has received from public authority a
franchise which also provide for the accomodation of the
general public, owe a duty to serve all persons
Negligence,
Breach of
who make proper application for such service and
Duty,
who comply with such reasonable rules as may
Damages
be fixed and make such reasonable compensation
as may be required; and a refusal or neglect to render such
service when asked or contracted for may give a cause of
action ez delicto. Accordingly, when a natural gas company
negligently fails to supply fuel gas, and cuts it off suddenly
and without notice, to the injury of the health of its customers,
a cause of action arises which is neither dependent upon a
contractual relation between the parties nor liable to be
defeated by proof of such a contractual relation: ZIochle v.
Allegheny Heating Co., (Superior Court of Pennsylvania,) 5 Pa.
Super. Ct. 2 1.
In a case recently decided by the Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Division, Second Department, two policemen
Imputed
were sent out with a police ambulance to bring in
Negligence a prisoner, one of them being detailed by their
superior officer to drive, and the other to remain inside the
ambulance. While crossing 'a railroad track, the ambulance
was struck by an engine, and the policeman inside was killed.
Under the circumstances; it was held that the negligence
of the driver, if any, was not imputable to the deceased, since
the former had the exclusive management of the vehicle:
Bailey v. Jourdan, 46 N. Y. Suppl. 399.
When, by the use of an infringing device, in connection with
a city's fire engine, the number of men required with each
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engine was reduced, the amount of their wages
should be included in the computation of saving&
Profits
or profits, though the city did not in fact reduce
the number of men employed, but either used them for other
purposes or allowed them to remain idle: Campbellv. Mayor,
etc., of Ciy of New York, (Circuit Court, S. D. New York,)
81 Fed Rep. 182.
Patents,
Infringement,

The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Divisiorr,.
Second Department, has recently ruled that persons who hold.
themselves out as insurance brokers assume toPrincipal and have the requisite knowledge, information, ability
Agent,
Insurance
Brokers,
Liability

and skill to transact such business for their patrons,.
and to use reasonable care, skill and diligence in
so doing ; and consequently, if such brokers, when

employed to procure insurance, place it in a company which
has never been authorized to do business in the state, and
from which they are not licensed to procure policies, they are
chargeable with negligence, since the policy is void, and are
liable for its consequences, if injurious to their employer.
Burges v.Jackson, 46 N. Y. Suppl. 326.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey has lately
held, that one who, by the appointment of one who has apparent authority to appoint, and apparently
Public Officers,
Officers de facto, exercises that authority, becomes a public officer
Appointment,
defacto, without dishonesty or fraud on his part,
Compensation
and renders the services required of the incumbent of the office to which he has so been appointed, may
recover the compensation provided for such services during'
the period of their rendition: Erwin v. City of Jersey City,
37 At. Rep. 732.
This decision is authority only where there is no officer
dejure. If there is such an officer, he is entitled to the
emoluments of the office, whether he performs the services
or not, provided his failure is not due to his pwn fault; and
the defacto officer cannot recover them, as the state would then
have to pay them twice.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has ruled that equity
will decree specific performance of a contract to operate
a railroad for a term of thirty years, for the benefit
Specific
Performance, of mortgage bondholders, when there is no other
Continuous
adequate remedy, though the contract calls for
Acts,
Railroad
continuous service, involving skill and judgment,
Lease
and will require continuous supervision on the
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part of the court: Schmidt v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 41 S.
W. Rep. 1015.

As a general rule, a contract for the performance of continuous services will not be enforced, since a court of equity cannot
give its personal supervision to the enforcement of such a
decree : Grape Creek Coal Co. v. Spellman, 39 Ill. App. 630,
189i; Roberts v. Kelsey, 38 Mich. 602, 1878, and consequently, the courts have refused to enforce a contract for the
operation of a railroad, or a street railway: Johnson v. Shrewsbury & Birmingham Ry. Co., 3 DeG., M. & G. 914, 1853 ;
City of Kingston v. Kingston El. Ry. Co., 33 Can. L. J. 395,
(1897); Shackleyv. Eastern R. R. Co, 9 8 Mass. 93, 1867; Port
Clinton R. R. Co. v. Cleveland & Toledo R. R. Co., 13 Ohio
St. 544, 1862; McCann v. South Nashville St. R. R. Co., 2
Tenn. Ch. 773, 1877 ; a contract that one party should use his
skill and machinery in the manufacture of a certain article,
while the other party agreed to purchase the manufactured
article from him, to the extent of the market demand, on
condition that the manufacturer should sell exclusively to him:
Bickford v. Davis, i i Fed. Rep. 549, 1 8 82 ; and a contract by
which the complainant agreed to furnish steam power delivered
to the pulley of an electric dynamo of the power of one
hundred kilowatts, and to furnish the power "constant" for
eighteen hours per day, from six o'clock A. M. to 12 o'clock
P. M., and to furnish all oil and waste and attendance for the
running of the generator and other apparatus, taking reasonable care of them, without responsibility for ordinary wear and
tear and for accidents, while the defendant agreed to furnish
generators and other electrical apparatus, to be placed in the
station or power house of the complainant, and to keep them
in good repair, connected by belt, ready for the pulley of the
engine to be attached to the pulley of the generator, and to
pay a daily sum for a specified number of cars: Electric Lighting Co. of Mobile v. Mobile & S. H. Ry. Co., 109 Ala. 19 o ,
1896.
Railroad leases and traffic contracts form a marked excepti6n to this rule, and such contracts will be enforced whenever
the remedy at law is inadequate, either directly, or by enjoining acts in violation of the contract. Wolverhampton & Walsall Ry. Co. v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., 16 L. R. Eq. 433,
1873; Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Coal
Co., 79 Ill. 121, 1875 ; D., L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Erie Ry. Co.,
21 N.J. Eq. 298, 1871; Cornwall & Lebanon R. R. Co.'s
-Appeal, 125 Pa. 232, 1889; Contra, Blackett v. Bates, i L. R.
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Ch. 17, 1865 ; Powel Duifryn Steam Coal Co. v. Taff Vale
Ry. Co., 9 L. R. Ch. 331, 1874.
In Prospect Park & Coney Island R. R. Co. v. Coney Island
& Brookln R. R. Co., 144 N. Y. 152, 1894, reversing 66 Hun,
366, 1892, the plaintiff corporation operated a steam railroad
running from Coney Island to a depot in the City of Brooklyn,
and also certain horse car lines in that city. The defendant
corporation was engaged in operating certain horse car lines
in the city and a line in Coney Island. They entered into a
contract by which the plaintiff granted to the defendant the
use of certain of its tracks in the city, from a point named to
the said depot, for twenty-one years, from June I, 1882, free
of charge, while the defendant covenanted to run cars to
plaintiff's depot to connect with the trains of the latter, running to and from the island. Either party could terminate
the contract on six months' notice. The parties acted under
the contract for over seven years, when the defendant adopted
the trolley method of propelling cars by electricity upon its
road between the city and the island, ceased to run its cars to
the depot, and informed plaintiff that it did not intend to do
so. The plaintiff then brought suit to compel the specific
performance of the contract, and the court held that the electrical method of propulsion adopted by the defendant could
not be regarded *as the use of steam as a motive power, and
did not bring the case within the provision providing for the
termination of the contract, and that the plaintiff was therefore entitled to the relief sought.
So, in Seaboard Air Line Belt R. R. Co. v. Western &
Atlantic R. R. Co., 97 Ga. 289, 1895, one railroad company
contracted with another, upon valuable consideration, to
4'interchange business, both through and local," with the
latter and its connecting lines for a specific term of years,
"' upon terms as favorable and advantageous to said road and
its connecting lines as those given to any other railroad in a
designated city." It was held that this contract bound the
former company not only as to freight shipped from or to
points on its own line, but also as to freight destined or
coming from points beyond the same, and it therefore could
-not, so long as it pursued a different and more favorable
course as to other railroads entering the city in question,
lawfully do anything to deprive the other party to the contract and its connections of the benefit of "through rates and
through proportions of rates, and bills of lading provided
therein," as to freights of the latter class; and that though
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the specific performance of such a contract could not be
decreed (as to which quare, in view of the other decisions
here cited,) the defendant would be enjoined during the life
of the contract from voluntarily entering into or maintaining
business relations with transportation companies beyond its
own line. with the intention or purpose of depriving the
plaintiff of the benefit thereof, and with such intention or purpose refusing to receive from such transportation companies
shipments of freight routed over the plaintiff's line and upon
bills of lading giving to it the benefit of " through rates and
through proportions" upon such shipments.
Such contracts will also be enforced between the successors
of the parties: n re Application of Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburgh R. R. Co. v. Ontario Southern R. R. Co., 16 Hun, (N.Y.),
445, 1879; Bald Eagle Valley R. R. Co. v. Nittany Valley
R. R. Co., 171 Pa. 284, 1895.
In Cumberland Valley R. R. Co. v. Gettysburg & Harrisburg
R. R. Co., 177 Pa. 519, 1896, a contract was thus enforced
which provided, inter alia:
Fourth. It is hereby covenanted and agreed by the parties.
hereto, that they will promote and facilitate the interchange
of cars and business between their respective roads-that
they will issue coupon tickets for passengers and through
bills of lading for freight interchanged between the said lines,
and that the earnings from joint business exchanged with theGettysburg & Harrisburg Railroad shall be apportioned to
and between the parties hereto on such a mileage basis as.
shall be agreed upon between the parties hereto.
Fifth. The parties of the third and fourth parts hereby
respectively covenant and agree that they will, so far as they
lawfully can, send to destination all traffic controlled by them,
via the lines of the parties of the first and second parts hereto.
Sixth. It being the intent of the parties hereto that their
lines shall be worked as far as possible in harmony with each
other, the Pennsylvania Railroad and the Cumberland Valley
Railroad Companies hereby agree that they will, so far as they
can consistently with their obligations .to other parties, makesuch arrangements as will promote the development of and
interchange of traffic with the other parties hereto, and that
they will receive at all points controlled by them, and promptly.
transport the traffic originating on or to be delivered to the
Gettysburg & Harrisburg Railroad and passing over their
lines to or towards its destination at as favorable rates as they
accord to any competing line or other parties upon like traffic.
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And the said South Mountain Railway and Mining Company and the Gettysburg & Harrisburg Railroad Company
agree that they will receive and transport promptly over their
lines and upon as favorable terms as they give to any other
parties, all traffic tendered to them by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, or the Cumberland Valley Railroad Company,
or lines controlled by them and destined to points upon their
said lines."
Similarly, in joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S. i, i891, affirming
29 Fed. Rep. 546, I886, the commissioners of Forest Park,
St. Louis, of the first part, the St. Louis County Railroad
Company of the second part, and the St. Louis, Kansas City
and Northern Railroad Company of the third part, entered
into what was known as the i"tripartite agreement," by
which (par. 9) the '"said party of the second part shall permit,
under such reasonable regulations and terms as may be
agreed upon, other railroads to use its right of way through
the park and up to the terminus of its road in the City of
St. Louis, upon such terms and for such fair and equitable
compensation to be paid to it therefor as may be agreed upon
by such companies." Under this it was held that the successor of the Kansas City Company was bound to permit the
St. Louis, Kansas City and Colorado Railroad Company to
use the right of way to the terminus of its road, that the tripartite agreement created an .easement in the property of the
County Company and the Kansas City Company, for the
benefit of the public, which might be availed of, with the conient of the public authorities, properly expressed, by other
railroad companies which might wish to use not only the
right of way through the park, but also that between the
park and the terminus; and that the specific performance of
the agreement could be enforced by enjoining the successor
of the Kansas Company from preventing the Colorado Company from using the right of '. ay.
Sundays are not to be included in computing the period of
ten days, within which the governor is required to pass upon
a statute submitted to him, under a constitutional
Statutes,
Submission provision, (Const. Ill., Art. 5, § i6,) providing
-to Governor, that "any bill which shall not be returned by the
Computatie
governor within ten days, (Sundays excepted,)
of Time
after it shall
have been presented to him, shall

become a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the
general assembly shall, by their adjournment, prevent its
return, in which case it shall be filed, with his objections, in
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the office of the secretary of state, within ten days after such
adjournment, or become a law:" People v. Rose, (Supreme
Court of Illinois,) 47 N. E. Rep. 547.
When two irreconcilable statutes are approved upon the
same day, resort may be had to the office of the secretary
of state, and also to the published statutes, for
TIm0o

Aproval

information

as to the order of their approval,

and the one that is found to have been approved

last is the prevailing law: Davis v. Whidden, (Supreme Court
of California,) 49 Pac. Rep. 766.
When a state becomes the owner of stock in a corporation,
it lays down its sovereign character, and puts itself on an
Salt against equality with private stockholders; and conseState,
quently the corporation and its directors and
Ownership of
Stock In
controlling officers, though in part appointed by
Railroad
the state, and specially representing its interests,
may be sued in the federal courts in respect of contracts
entered into by the corporation, to the same extent as a
corporation wholly owned and controlled by private individuals; and when the governor and attorney general are
invested by law with the control of all suits in relation
to the property of the state in such corporation,.
they are proper parties defendant to a suit in equity
to establish the validity of a lease of the property of the
corporation, and enjoin threatened attacks thereon: Southern
Ry. Co. v. North Carolina R. R. Co., (Circuit Court, N. D.
North Carolina,) 81 Fed. Rep. 595.

An agreement by which one who enters the employ
of a manufacturer of a medicine compounded by a secret
process, not to make or sell any of the medicine,
Trade Secret, or reveal the secret of its composition, is not in
Injunction
restraint of trade, and will be enforced by injunction; and, further, equity will not permit one who has sold for
a valuable consideration the absolute and exclusive property
in a medicine compounded by a secret process to reveal that
secret to a third person, either by himself or through a member of his family, and will restrain by injunction the use of
such a secret, if revealed: C. F. Simmons Medicine Co. v.
Simmons, (Circuit Court, E. D. Arkansas,) 8I Fed. Rep. 163.
Ardemus Stewart.

